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Pluralism and anti-pluralism in economics: The atomistic individual 
and religious fundamentalism* 
 
John Davis, Marquette University and University of Amsterdam 
 
Abstract: This short paper examines a possible connection between religion and economics in terms of 
the parallelism between the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine.  The paper 
explores whether resistance to pluralism in economics as a methodological practice might be 
illuminated in terms of this connection.  On this view, resistance to pluralism in economics is not a 
matter of economists holding methodological views about economics practice that are contrary to 
pluralism, but is rather a kind of anti-pluralism reflecting an intransigent defense of the atomistic 
individual view as a kind of core or ‘untouchable’ deep doctrine.  Two arguments are advanced to 
demonstrate the parallelism between the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine.   
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1 Introduction 
Two students came up to me once at a conference in Europe at which pluralism in economics had been 
discussed, and said they believed people in the United States were quite religious, and asked was this 
possibly a reason why economists in the US were so strongly attached to standard economic theory?  
Basically they were trying to tie something they understood broadly as a religious fundamentalism to 
something on the order of an economic fundamentalism, and thought that if there was a connection, 
this meant that pluralism in economics was not likely to find fertile soil in the US.  I replied that I hadn’t 
thought about the idea, and that I was skeptical that such an argument could be made in a persuasive 
way.  If they meant that the views of American economists were to be explained by their being religious, 
then the view was too simple and likely wrong.  I also thought there might be many reasons for what 
could be called an economic fundamentalism in the US, including a widely held commitment among 
many American economists to a neoliberal view of the world.  But the question of a link between US 
economics and religion stuck with me.  Subsequently I found that Robert Nelson (Nelson, 2001; see also 
Perlman, 2003) had been similarly provoked by the relationship between economics and religion in the 
US, and so I ultimately asked myself how this issue could conceivably be addressed.  This brief comment 
is the result of that reflection.  To begin, I asked myself why there was indeed so little support for 
pluralism in economics in the US, and then made a distinction between the nature and status of 
pluralism in economics. 
 
2 Pluralism vs. anti-pluralism in economics 
What is the nature and status of pluralism in economics?  Its nature is not much disputed: it is widely 
agreed to be a methodological value that it is often believed ought to govern economists’ practice vis-à-
vis approaches to the subject matter of economics rival to their own, specifically, economists ought to 
adopt a position of open-mindedness toward approaches different from their own.  Its status, however, 
is more difficult to explain.  Most heterodox economists would say that mainstream economics is not 
pluralistic.  But what does this mean?  If we go by the nature of pluralism as stated above, this suggests 
that many economists do not share this particular methodological value, and do not believe that they 
ought to adopt a position of open-mindedness toward approaches different than their own.  In effect, 
they have different methodological values that govern their practice.  For example, perhaps they believe 
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that economics advances through a competition between approaches, and that they should dedicate 
themselves to the strongest defense of approaches they think best.   
This interpretation may have some truth to it, but in my view it produces an incomplete understanding 
of the status of pluralism in economics in the US.  The problem with making this a matter of economists 
having different methodological values is that this implies that the status of pluralism in economics a 
matter of normative dispute over how economics ought to be practiced.  But at the same time we 
seldom see any debate or discussion over methodological values in economics.  Thus something else 
seems to motivate most American economists in this regard, and absent any other apparent basis for 
their position, I suggest that there must be certain underlying forces operating in mainstream economics 
that constitute inherent barriers to pluralist practice.  On this view, pluralism does not operate in any 
significant way in economics not because there are differences between economists regarding 
methodological values; pluralism does not operate in any significant way in economics because of 
certain forces operating in economics that push methodological debate to the side altogether.  That is, 
the opposite of pluralism in economics is not the methodological goal of dedicated defense of one’s own 
explanation to give it the best hearing possible as suggested above, but rather an anti-pluralism driven 
by forces underlying much contemporary economic theorizing that exclude reasonable debate over 
what methods of analysis are admissable.   
Suppose, then, that anti-pluralism seen as a force operating in economics has two characteristics.  First, 
it involves intransigent opposition to openness based on the need to defend specific deep conceptual 
structures which is disconnected from all reasonable debate over their coherence and epistemic value.  
These ‘untouchables,’ as I will call them, are always defended, in one form or another, no matter what 
might be argued about them or what happens to the rest of the theory in which they operate.  Imre 
Lakatos (1970) believe something like untouchable conceptual structures existed as the hard core of 
most scientific theories, though he did not seek to explain why they exist.  Second, the meaning of these 
untouchable conceptual structures might be said to have a two-tier character: their surface meanings 
are shaped by the theories in which they operate, but they also possess further underlying meanings to 
which these surface meanings are related.  These underlying meanings generally go unrecognized, so 
that conceptual elaboration is confined to the surface meanings, the defense of which, however, is 
motivated by attachment to their underlying meanings.  The attachment to these underlying meanings 
makes their proponents’ intransigent opposition to openness a matter of a force operating within 
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science rather than an epistemic concern, and thus makes their opposition to others’ views an anti-
pluralism rather than a disagreement over methodological values.  
 
3 The atomistic individual as a domain of surface meaning 
Is this two-tier meaning view plausible?  The test of the view, it seems fair to say, rests with whether it 
can be applied to examples of intransigence over specific conceptual structures in economics.  Of course 
what counts as intransigence can be debated, but in any event I nominate one particular conceptual 
structure in economics as an example par excellence of where I believe many economists will accept 
very little compromise or modification of basic assumptions involved, and which indeed for many 
arguably constitutes the lynch pin of standard theory: the atomistic individual concept.  The basic 
assumptions I refer to are what I characterized as surface meanings, which are assumptions shaped by 
the theories in which they operate.  At this level, economists who disagree in many ways, for example, 
such as neoclassical and behavioral economists who differ over the nature of motivation and how 
markets work, may still share a single set of basic assumptions that define the atomistic individual.  In 
this section I describe these basic surface assumptions, and in the next section then describe the further 
underlying assumptions to which I believe these surface assumptions are linked, and which therefore on 
the argument here would justify characterizing the proponents of the atomistic individual doctrine as 
anti-pluralist. 
The atomistic individual idea is that people are essentially autonomous.  This means that though what 
they do may be influenced by others (as in game theory) and by what goes on in economic life (how 
prices and incomes constrain their choices), ultimately their actions stem from them alone.  This view 
has as its most common statement the idea that a person’s preferences are exogenous.  It is an odd 
view, because everyone – including proponents of the doctrine – knows that people’s preferences are 
influenced by many things.  Despite this, the standard view is that why people come to have the 
preferences they do is irrelevant to the explanation of choice which takes them as given in the act of 
choice.  It is true, of course, that one can explain choice with given preferences without saying anything 
about the formation of those preferences.  Their formation and the person’s acting upon them are two 
different things.  But if we know preferences are susceptible to being influenced, why would we think 
this is a good explanation of choice?  Why shouldn’t how preferences are formed be central to our 
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explanations of the choices people make?  The answer, I suggest, is that one would only think the 
standard view is a good explanation of choice if one was already convinced that people’s actions must 
ultimately stem from them alone and that people are essentially autonomous. 
To better understand this commitment to autonomy, we should note what the specific grounds are in 
standard theory for the idea that people are essentially autonomous.   Thus, autonomy is justified by 
saying that individuals have their own separate utility functions (whatever might be the origins of their 
preferences).  The basis for this claim is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function theorem (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), which says that if a specific set of logical assumptions regarding 
preferences is satisfied (completeness, transitivity, independence, and continuity), the individual has a 
well-defined preference ordering, which can be represented by a distinct (monotonic) individual utility 
function.  That is, the well-orderedness of preferences implies personal autonomy (and vice versa).  
Needless to say, there has been much experimental research in recent years that casts doubt on 
whether this set of logical assumptions can be said to apply to people’s preferences.2  But it seems 
another question should have been raised first regarding the ‘own separate utility function’ basis for 
personal autonomy.  That is, why should one even think a logical derivation of autonomy constitutes a 
sound basis for ascribing autonomy to people?  Since the deductive inference of the individual utility 
functions effectively generates autonomy by assumption, this axiomatic approach to autonomy only 
affirms what people have decided they wish to believe.3  Thus the recourse to a logical derivation of the 
atomistic individual basically serves the purpose of putting debate over how we should understand 
individuals off the table. 
The subsequent development of the theory of rational choice further reinforces the autonomy-by-fiat 
approach.  For example, despite their continued use of the utility function concept, most economists 
who use standard modeling use revealed preference theory to explain choice, and this allows them to 
deny that individual psychology has any relevance to the theory of choice (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 
2008).  Revealed preference theory can be interpreted as claiming that choice reveals preferences, and 
thereby provides what economists believe to be an objective grounding for the idea that preference 
grounds the theory of demand.   This justifies dropping any substantive reference to preference and 
                                                            
2 Thus it is not clear whether behavioral economics shares the atomistic individual doctrine, an issue I put aside 
here to focus on standard neoclassical theory, though see my view on this in Davis (2011). 
3 Or perhaps what their models of agents as atomistic require of them. 
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personal psychology from the analysis of choice.  It thereby compels us to say that choice is always 
autonomous choice, since nothing regarding how people might come to have the preferences they have 
can enter into its explanation.  Choice is thus defined as the product of an autonomous individual.  Note 
that the original justification for revealed preference theory was that individual psychology is 
unobservable, while one can observe people’s choices (Samuelson, 1938).  But what counts as 
observable and unobservable can be subject to debate.   Revealed preference theory puts off this 
debate by simply denying that human psychology, or for that matter anything, might condition choice.   
The atomistic individual, then, is necessarily an autonomous being.4 
Consider for a moment, however, what might be involved in thinking about individuals were one not to 
insist on their irreducible autonomy.  To say that individual behavior is not fully autonomous is to say 
that individuals’ choices are influenced by economic and social circumstances, and thus that individual 
behavior is in some manner endogenous to those circumstances.  Of course economists reflect all the 
time upon what counts as exogenous and endogenous in developing economic models, and say that we 
should treat as exogenous those factors that influence but are not influenced by factors endogenously 
determined in their models.  But this always raises the question of whether a model’s exogenous factors 
might indeed be influenced by factors endogenous to that model, and so it is fair to say that an 
important part of the history of model development in economics involves continually probing what 
counts as exogenous in the pursuit of ever more comprehensive accounts of systems of determination 
in economic life.  In the face of this, it is surely odd that so many mainstream economists have remained 
for over a century unwilling to investigate the exogeneity of individual preferences, the basis for treating 
the individual as an autonomous being.  Why this is so, I will now argue, is that the atomistic individual is 
foundational to their anti-pluralism.  This is to say that these economists’ position is not one rooted in 
reasoned debate over the merits of different approaches in economics, but is driven by forces 
associated with unhesitating commitment to the further underlying meanings that are attached to the 
surface meanings of the atomistic individual idea discussed above.  In the next section I spell out what 
underlying meanings may lie behind the surface meanings of the doctrine, and associate them with a 
similar deep commitment, namely, religious fundamentalism. 
                                                            
4 For a fuller argument see Sen (1973) where it is argued that revealed preference theory assumes what it aims to 
provide (that is, the axioms of choice).  Thus it reflects but does not support the view that preferences are 
exogenous and people are autonomous atomistic agents. 
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4 Religious fundamentalism and the underlying meaning of the atomistic individual idea 
What do I mean by religious fundamentalism?  To be clear, I do not intend one popular meaning of 
fundamentalism, namely, conservative religious movements that often emphasize the literal 
interpretation of religious texts.  Rather by the term religious fundamentalism I refer to what counts as 
fundamental doctrine in most monotheistic religions in virtue of what is essential to the nature of that 
type of religious belief.  For example, it is fundamental to most monotheistic religions to say that the 
natural world must somehow be explained by its relation to God.  Or, it is fundamental to most to say 
that God exceeds human understanding, and that faith is central to religious belief.  There are indeed 
many dimensions of religious fundamentalism understood in this way, but the discussion here addresses 
only one of them, albeit one which is widely shared across religions that are otherwise quite different.  
This is the doctrine of the individual human soul.  It is a doctrine that is fundamental, because it stands 
as a central if not indispensable component in the explanation of the relationship between human life 
and a transcendent God (at least in monotheism).  Accordingly it is a doctrine which generally cannot be 
given up without at the same time giving up the religious commitment with which it is associated.  
Consider, then, two main aspects of the individual human soul doctrine. 
First, human souls are essentially individual.  A person’s relationship to God, as manifest in having a soul, 
is fully individual.  This is so strongly believed that it seems nonsensical to say, for example, that two 
people could share a human soul (putting aside metaphorical speech).  But that idea is neither 
nonsensical nor logically contradictory; it is simply incompatible with the doctrine of the human soul as 
found in most religions which assign each individual one soul.   Second, and this is especially important, 
there is only one thing that has a fundamental influence on or is a determinant of the well-being of the 
individual human soul, namely, its relation to God.  Thus neither other people’s souls nor anything in the 
natural world can interfere with or otherwise condition the relationship between an individual soul and 
God.   
I want to argue, then, that economists’ anti-pluralism regarding the atomist agent concept is analogous 
to religious fundamentalism regarding the individual soul.  The argument makes two points: (a) that the 
atomistic individual doctrine operates as an untouchable conceptual structure in economics, and (b) 
that it does so because it possesses the same features as religious doctrines that are analogous in form.  
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Then though the surface meanings of atomistic individual doctrine are specific to economics, its being an 
‘untouchable’ in economics is due to its being treated as a fundamental, an underlying meaning 
associated with doctrines that are fundamental in other domains, such as the human soul doctrine.  
Thus, I do not argue that the atomistic individual doctrine is actually derived from the human soul 
doctrine, or even that it stems from a similar psychological impulse, but rather that the two doctrines 
are structurally analogous.   
Consider simply the parallels or structural similarities between the atomistic individual doctrine and the 
human soul doctrine.  In the human soul doctrine the individual is essentially autonomous; similarly in 
the atomistic individual doctrine the individual is essentially autonomous.  Further, in the human soul 
doctrine nothing in the natural world can limit the individuality of the human soul; similarly in the 
atomistic individual doctrine nothing in human psychology or social interaction can limit a person’s 
essential individuality.  Thus the two doctrines are homeomorphic or have the same structures.  But 
while the human soul doctrine is rooted in the idea that people have an exclusive individual relationship 
to God, there is no evident reason from the perspective of ordinary reasoning about modeling practices 
in economics to think that the pattern of preferences that define an agent’s individuality are exogenous.  
Thus it is not implausible to say, based on the structural similarity of the two doctrines that the surface 
meaning of the atomistic individual doctrine employs a kind of human soul doctrine as its deeper 
meaning. 
This argument, of course, does not prove that religious fundamentalism and the human soul doctrine 
provide the underlying meaning of the atomistic individual doctrine.  Indeed I remain skeptical that 
arguments stronger than the suggestive ones above can be made.  At the same time, they point to an 
issue that it seems ought to be addressed, namely, that the logical character of the atomistic individual 
doctrine bears a strong resemblance to religious argument in how they both follow out the implications 
of a basic set of assumptions, and that this is not in keeping with standard procedures for theoretical 
advance in science, including much of economics, which sets aside purely logical argument and tests the 
empirical standing of basic assumptions.  At the very least, then, the arguments here are an invitation to 
proponents of the atomistic individual doctrine to explain their grounds for supposing individuals are 
essentially autonomous.  That this explanation is likely not forthcoming, however, seems to confirm its 
role as an ‘untouchable’ in economics. 
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5   The status of pluralism in economics 
My starting point in this discussion was the lack of support for pluralism in economics.  Indeed most 
economists do not even see pluralism in economics as an issue, if they recognize the idea at all.  This is 
compatible with their simply having a different view of methodological practice in economics, such as 
the idea that one ought to allow the competition between different approaches (in the ‘marketplace of 
ideas’) determine which ideas prevail.  Against this interpretation, however, is the fact that economists 
nonetheless do practice a kind of ‘pluralism’ – if not in name – then institutionally speaking with respect 
to specialization across and within economic fields.  It is ‘pluralist’ in a way, and involves a kind of open-
mindedness, because economics departments do not expect specializations, say, industrial organization 
and monetary economics, to compete with one another, and generally accept that there are different 
legitimate research programs in different fields.  Further, not only is ‘pluralism’ in this sense firmly 
institutionalized in economics as a methodological practice, but that practice is based on principles of 
cooperation and not competition.  But this creates a puzzle.  Why is the discourse of pluralism itself so 
absent from economics?  My answer concerns the role of the ‘untouchables’ in economics. 
One aspect of an institutionalized ‘pluralism’ built around specialization, then, is that it leaves much 
about the specialization to the specialist acting as a monopolist on the condition that the specialist and 
specialization are seen as having certain broadly acceptable features, such a set of conceptual constructs 
that are shared across fields.  Thus every specialization possesses a domain of non-interference but also 
possesses certain shared entry points.  My contention, thus, is that this combination promotes an 
intransigence regarding these shared constructs, since they are the means by which fields secure their 
domains of non-interference.  An institutionalized ‘pluralism’ by fields, that is, ironically depends upon a 
rejection of pluralism regarding shared conceptual constructs which  could well then have the effect of 
discouraging general pluralist discourse.  In effect, the price of private ‘pluralism’ is public anti-pluralism.   
This sort of explanation raises the question of why particular conceptual constructs become pivotal in 
sustaining private ‘pluralism’ and public anti-pluralism.  This paper provides an explanation of how the 
atomistic individual doctrine could be thought to fulfill this pivotal shared construct role by explaining it 
as fundamentalist.  The case for this fundamentalism rests on the parallel structures and functionalities 
of the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine, which clearly has the status of a 
fundamental doctrine in monotheistic religion.  The argument was not, it should again be emphasized, 
that the atomistic individual doctrine is actually derived from the human soul doctrine.  Rather as a 
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shared construct in economics that operates as an ‘untouchable’ it must have the same characteristics 
as other doctrines that have this status.  The human soul doctrine is a premier model in this regard, and 
consequently what makes it fundamental in religion provides guidelines for the underlying meaning of 
the atomistic individual doctrine that must be retained in its surface meanings.   
Thus the atomistic individual doctrine appears to work quite like a kind of religious fundamentalism.  
This still leaves unaddressed the two European students’ question about US economists, religion, and 
pluralism.  After all, specialization in economics and mainstream doctrines exist elsewhere as well.  But 
they do seem to have been right on the mark in asking about the foundations of intolerance and what 
has been called here anti-pluralism. 
 
References 
Davis, J. (2011) Individuals and Identity in Economics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). 
Gul, F. and Pesendorfer, W. (2008) The Case for Mindless Economics, in: A. Caplin & A. Schotter (Eds.) 
The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, pp. 3-39 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
Lakatos, I. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in: I. Lakatos & 
A. Musgrave (Eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp.  91-196 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Nelson, Robert (2001) Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond, University 
Park, PA: Penn State University. 
Neumann, J. von, and Morgenstern, O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, second edition 
1947, third edition 1953 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press).    
Perlman, Mark (2003) “Robert H. Nelson on Romanism, Protestantism and American Economics: a 
review essay,” Review of Political Economy 15 (2): 245-55. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1938) A Note on the Pure theory of Consumer Behavior, Economica, 5, pp. 61-71. 
11 
 
Sen, A. (1973) Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, Economica, 40, pp. 241-259. 
